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The thesis of this paper is that our understanding of life, as re-
flected in the biological and medical sciences but also in our
everyday transactions, has been hampered by an inappropriate
metaphysics. The metaphysics that has dominated Western phi-
losophy, and that currently shapes most understanding of life and
the life sciences, sees the world as composed of things and their
properties.  While  these  things  appear  to  undergo  all  kinds  of
changes,  it  has  often  been supposed  that  this  amounts  to no
more than a change in the spatial relations of their unchanging
parts.
From antiquity, however, there has been a rival to this view, the
process  ontology,  associated in  antiquity  with the fragmentary
surviving writings of Heraclitus. In the last century it has been es-
pecially  associated  with  the  work  of  the British  metaphysician
and logician, Alfred North Whitehead. For process ontology, what
most  fundamentally  exists  is  change,  or  process.  What we are
tempted to think of as constant things are in reality merely tem-
porary stabilities in this constant flux of change, eddies in the flux
of process.
My main claim in this paper will be that a metaphysics of this lat-
ter kind is the only kind adequate to making sense of the living
world. After explaining in more detail,  the differences between
these ontological views, I shall illustrate the advantages of a pro-
cess ontology with reference to the category of organism. Finally
I shall explore some further implications of a process ontology for
biology and for philosophy.
Keywords: process  ontology,  organism,  metaphysics  of  science,
evolution, inheritance, personal identity, free will
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Тезис автора состоит в том, что наше понимание жизни, отра-
женное в биологических и медицинских науках, а также в на-
ших повседневных делах, было затруднено неуместной мета-
физикой.  Метафизика,  которая  доминировала  в  западной
философии и которая сейчас в значительной степени опреде-
ляет понимание жизни и наук о жизни, видит мир как состоя-
щий из вещей и их свойств. И хотя эти вещи, по-видимому,
претерпевают всевозможные изменения, предполагается, что
это всего лишь изменение пространственных отношений их
неизменных частей. Однако с древности альтернативу этому
подходу представляла онтология процесса, связанная с фраг-
ментарно сохранившимися произведениями Гераклита. В про-
шлом же веке она нашла выражение в работах британского
метафизика и логика А. Уайтхеда. С позиции онтологии про-
цесса то, что существует, представляет собой изменение, или
процесс. То, что мы склонны считать постоянными вещами, на
самом деле является лишь временной стабильностью в из-
вечной  череде  изменений,  вихрями  в  процессуальном  по-
токе. Автор полагает, что метафизика этого последнего типа
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является  единственно  адекватной  пониманию  живого  мира.
После более подробного объяснения различий между этими
онтологическими  перспективами  автор  анализирует  преиму-
щества онтологии процесса применительно к категории орга-
низмов. В статье также рассматриваются некоторые дальней-
шие следствия онтологии процесса для биологии и философии.
Ключевые слова: процесс, онтология, организм, метафизика нау-
ки,  эволюция,  наследование,  персональная  идентичность,  сво-
бодная воля
1. Introduction
The thesis  of  this  paper  is  that  our understanding of life,  as  reflected
in the biological and medical sciences but also in our everyday transac-
tions,  has  been hampered by an inappropriate metaphysics.  The meta-
physics that has dominated Western philosophy, and that currently shapes
most understanding of life and the life sciences, sees the world as com-
posed of things and their properties. Among those things are a subset of
simple things (atoms) – though this aspect of the picture has been greatly
complicated by developments in physics since around 1900 – and the fa-
miliar  macroscopic  entities  of  everyday experience are  complex struc-
tures of these simple things. These complex things undergo change. That
is to say, they have different properties at different times, and such dif -
ferences  amount  to a thing undergoing change.  Following seventeenth
century founders of the Scientific Revolution, such as John Locke and
Robert Boyle, these changes are often thought of as grounded in changes
in the way the simple things that make up a complex thing are arranged.
From antiquity, however, there has been a rival to this view, more
prominent in Eastern philosophical traditions, but a persistent theme also
in the West. I refer to process ontology, associated in antiquity with the
fragmentary surviving writings of Heraclitus. In the last century it  has
been especially associated with the work of the British metaphysician and
logician, Alfred North Whitehead1. For process ontology, what most fun-
damentally exists is change, or process. What we are tempted to think of
as constant things are in reality merely temporary stabilities in this con-
stant flux of change, eddies in the flux of process.
My main claim in this paper will be that a metaphysics of this latter
kind  is  the  only kind  adequate  to  making sense  of  the  living  world2.
1 The classic source is [Whitehead, 1957]. A more accessible introduction is [Whitehead,
1961 (1933)].
2 This, and several other themes in this essay, are explored in greater depth in [Ni-
cholson and Dupré,  2018].  See especially the introduction,  [Dupré and Nicholson,




I shall not say much about the application of the view to the level of the
hypothetical simple things of the alternative view. I will just remark that
to a casual view contemporary physics looks a great deal more like a the-
ory of processes than a theory of things. As one of the most prominent re-
cent  defenders  of  process  metaphysics,  the  American  philosopher
Nicholas  Rescher  [1996,  p.  97],  put  it,  echoing the earlier  reaction of
Whitehead,  “the rise of the quantum theory put  money in the process
philosopher’s bank account”.
But here I shall stick with biology. After saying a bit more, in the
next section, about the difference between processes and things, in sec-
tion 3 I shall explain several reasons why organisms, a central ontological
category in any biological  science,  are  much better  seen as  a kind of
process. In section 4 I shall discuss some biological issues that can be
understood differently, and I think better, from this perspective. Finally,
and briefly, in section 5 I shall consider some implications for some more
traditionally philosophical issues. But first I shall conclude this introduc-
tory section with a very brief further word about Whitehead.
Whitehead  is  indisputably  the  philosopher  from  the  last  century
most  widely associated with process  philosophy. Nonetheless,  I  shall
not use his work as a starting point, for several reasons. First, White -
head’s  philosophy  is  notoriously  difficult,  even  obscure.  Arguably,
the assumption that an interest  in process thinking must pass through
the study of Whitehead has been a deterrent to many potential process
philosophers. Second, Whitehead’s philosophy of process is deeply in-
tertwined with his theology and his commitment to a version of panpsy-
chism. Neither of these is a topic that I am much interested in engaging
with. But perhaps most important, it is open to question whether White-
head is,  strictly speaking,  a process  ontologist.  The rationale for  this
rather surprising claim is that Whitehead promotes a kind of atomism
(see [Simons, 2018, p. 53]). The atoms in question are what Whitehead
calls “actual occasions” or,  synonymously, “actual entities”. Although
these are analysable, they do not appear to be subject to change. So at
the base of his philosophy, it appears, are not processes but unchanging
atoms.
2. Things and Processes
Things, or substances, have been a central philosophical topic for millen-
nia, and I can hardly attempt a survey of this history here. However, there
are certain widely agreed points. Things persist through time; they have
(reasonably) sharp boundaries; and they are autonomous: they do not de-
pend on anything else for their  existence.  The classical  atoms,  micro-
scopic impenetrable spheres, provide an important paradigm for entities
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that perfectly realise these conditions. But more familiar everyday items
such as tables, chairs, and rocks also appear to fit the bill.
A crucial point is that other things being equal, things stay the same.
It  is  indeed  difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  to  make  sense  of  change
in a world of things. The problem can be seen in terms of Leibniz’s law.
Informally, this law states that if two things are identical they have all
the same properties. They are, after all, the same thing. For a thing to per-
sist is for the thing at one time to be identical to the thing at a later time.
But for thing to change is for it to have different properties at different
times. Therefore the thing after a change cannot be identical to the thing
before that change and, following Leibniz’s law, it cannot remain the same
thing. Standard solutions to this problem require a distinction between ac-
cidental  properties  that  are  subject  to  change,  and essential  properties
the stability of which constitutes the persistence of the organism. All I shall
say about this is that a strong consensus in the philosophy of biology re-
jects any kind of essentialism (e.g., [Hull, 1965; Dupré, 2002]; though see
[Devitt, 2008]).
In attempting to understand how things change, recent Western phi-
losophy  has  hovered  between  two  poles.  The  four-dimensionalist,  or
“perdurantist” view, sees objects as composed of (unchanging) temporal
parts strung together through time, in so-called space-time worms. On such
a view change is at least illusory sub specie aeternitate. The alternative
three-dimensionalist,  or  “endurantist”  view  insists  in  opposition  to
the former view that at any moment an object is “wholly present”, it does
not consist merely of a temporal part of the whole object3. But then it
needs to be explained how something wholly present at t1 can be the
same thing as something wholly present at t2. It is plausible that neither
of these positions really takes change seriously (for detailed argument to
this effect, see [Meincke, 2018a]).
A process, at any rate, is something for which change is essential.
There are many kinds of processes. Some, like erosion or inflation, re-
quire something else to which they happen – cliffs or economies. Others
just happen. The “it” in the English expression “it is raining” does not re-
fer to any thing that is raining. Here, however, I am concerned with pro-
cesses that are individuals, and that persist over time. Paradigmatic here
are the already mentioned eddies, or vortices. A striking instance is the
Great Red Spot on the planet Jupiter. This has persisted for centuries, but
its persistence is at every moment dependent on activity, in this case the
very rapid winds that circulate around it. Unlike a thing, it cannot persist
without change; if the winds ceased the Red Spot would no longer exist.
3 The terms “endurantism” and “perdurantism” were introduced by David Lewis (1986).
Representative defenders of each position are [Sider, 2001] and [Lewis, 1986] for per-
durantism, and [Lowe, 1998] or [Simons, 1987] for endurantism.
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A process ontology, as I conceive it, is one that asserts the primacy of
change: everything is in flux, and the appearance of stable entities is ulti-
mately illusory [Dupré and Nicholson, 2018]. So, recalling my earlier re-
mark about Whitehead, an ontology that sees extended processes as built
up out of unchanging parts is not, in this sense, a true process ontology.
The challenge for a process ontology is to explain the appearance, ulti-
mately the illusion, of stable things.
This last point leads to a crucial consequence of recognising the pro-
cessual nature of reality. When a thing, or substance undergoes change
this calls out for explanation. Indeed explaining why things change is of-
ten thought of as the central aim of science. But in a world of process,
change is everywhere. Before we can understand why what we identify as
the stable things change, we need to understand why they ever stayed the
same. Stability is always an explanandum. Perhaps this is obvious in biol-
ogy. Much biological work aims to explain homeostasis, the stability of
properties of the organism, or homeorhesis,  C.H. Waddington’s (1957)
valuable term for the maintenance of an organism on a typical trajectory,
as in ontogeny. For several reasons, which I shall discuss further below,
the stability or persistence of a living system should hardly be taken for
granted. Nonetheless, most obviously in medicine, we do tend to think of
stability as a default.  Disease, we often assume, always requires some
kind of explanation external to the proper nature of the organism. One of
the points of recognising the processual character of life is to avoid this
kind of error.
3. Organisms
Organisms have  often  been  taken as  paradigmatic  substances  or  even
things. Aristotle is the philosopher most famous for treating organisms
this way, although he is perhaps also the substance philosopher most sen-
sitive to the dynamic nature of organisms. Recalling the characteristics of
things listed earlier, organisms persist through time, they have reasonably
sharp boundaries, and they do not depend on anything else for their exis-
tence. Or so it is often assumed. In fact none of the preceding statements
is true without some considerable qualification, and hence, I shall argue,
organisms are more accurately understood as processes.
Consider first the persistence through time of organisms. Although
we do, certainly, track organisms through time, it is not always so simple
to say what we are tracking. Consider the familiar life cycle of an insect,
through the stages of egg, larva, pupa, and adult. There is no doubt a spa-
tio-temporal continuity between these stages, but what it is it that con-
tinues? Recall the familiar puzzles in the literature of personal identity.
Following a parable discussed by John Locke, we may be comfortable
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in principle with the possibility of a prince turning into a cobbler [Locke,
1975 (1694), ch. 27]. The prince remains at least an adult human, if with
a rather different social status. But, pace Kafka, could one really turn into
an insect? In what sense could that insect possibly be the same thing as
the previously existing person. In Kafka’s story the answer is provided by
continuity of consciousness. But if this seems to makes sense, it is be-
cause we are so used to the dualist ontology in which the part of a person
that has consciousness is a separate thing from the material, biological
part. We imagine the former moving to inhabit a different biological or-
ganism or, in Kafka’s case, remaining in place while the organism sur-
rounding it  transforms drastically.  If  we take a  materialist  perspective
on the matter, we should not admit such a separation and rather say that
a human had ceased to exist and an insect had somehow come into exis-
tence at the same time.
But now let’s return to real insects, which do indeed undergo meta-
morphoses from egg to larva to pupa to adult. These are changes little
less dramatic than those from human to insect. How can the egg and the
adult be the same thing? Still less, could they share the same essence?4
The answer I suggest is that they are not, but that they are stages of the
same process. Although humans do not undergo changes as dramatic as
those of the insect, the similarity of the human zygote and the adult hu-
man is no greater. In fact all  organisms have life cycles encompassing
more or less fundamental  changes of form. The puzzles to which this
gives rise if  we try to understand these changes as transformations of
a persistent thing are immediately dispelled when we realise that the or-
ganism is a process, its life cycle. The connections between the stages of
a process are merely causal5. There is no question of identity in the sense
taken to require an appeal to Leibniz’s law.
Now consider the idea that organisms are autonomous. Substances,
or things, have generally been understood as those entities that can exist
by themselves, without requiring the existence of anything else. But as is
widely remarked, organisms are systems far from thermodynamic equi-
librium, requiring for their persistence a constant intake of matter or en-
ergy from their environment6.  The constancy of form that an organism
4 One might imagine that the genome could serve this essentialist role. I explain the
problems with this idea in [Dupré, 2012, ch. 7]
5 Causal connection is not, of course, sufficient to count two arrangements of matter as
stages of the same process.  In the case of an organism, and to a lesser extent for
inanimate processes such as storms or rivers, there is some further kind of integration
that  is  required,  a complex condition indeed for  the organism.  The nature  of  this
integration is a question well beyond the scope of the present paper. The problem has
been addressed under the rubric of “organisation” in a body of work by Alvaro Moreno
and colleagues. See, e.g., [Moreno and Mossio, 2015; Arnellos, 2018].




exhibits is not something that continues by default, until something hap-
pens to disrupt it. It is something that is achieved by the organism’s meta-
bolism constantly maintaining its form and resisting entropy by using this
intake of energy from the environment; and organisms have to interact
with their environments to ensure this intake of energy. The form is main-
tained by this constant flow of energy in a way parallel to, if vastly more
complex than, that in which an eddy is maintained by the flow of water
in a stream. It is the manifestation of a massively complex and exquisitely
orchestrated set of processes.
There is an equally important reason why we should not think of organ-
isms as autonomous substances. This is that all or almost all multicellular
organisms, and perhaps most single celled organisms, are in fact obligately
symbiotic  (for  discussion see,  e.g.,  [Dupré and O’Malley,  2009;  Dupré,
2012, ch. 4]). As we have come to realise, we are not, in the sense that has
usually been assumed, entirely human. Somewhere between half and 90%
of the cells in our bodies are microbes, and a substantial proportion of these
are  not  mere  passengers,  but  serve  functions  essential  to  our  thriving.
A common response to this with which I have much sympathy is to say that
the organism is composed not just of the traditionally human cells, the lin-
eage that descended from our initiating zygote, but the symbiotic whole,
what has come to be known as a holobiont (e.g., [Gilbert et al., 2012]).
So perhaps the organism is, in this sense anyhow, autonomous; it just contains
a lot more stuff than has generally been assumed. I don’t think this move
helps much, because there are a number of other ways in which organisms
are fundamentally dependent on other organisms. In our own case, again,
despite the attention that has been focused in social and political thought
on the individual, we are profoundly and obligatorily social organisms.
But this leads to the third statement with which I introduced the topic
of organisms, that an organism is a thing with sharp boundaries. Are obli-
gate symbionts really separate entities, or at some point do the symbiotic
partners merge to become a single entity? The answer is clearly that they
do sometimes merge, and indeed some, notably the pioneering scientist
Lynn Margulis, have believed that this kind of merger is the main driver
of major evolutionary change [Margulis and Fester,  1991]. Whether or
not this is right, Margulis and others have convinced biologists that many
fundamental evolutionary changes have been of this kind. Most famous is
the emergence of the eukaryotic cell from some kind of merger – the de-
tails  of  which  admittedly  remain  highly  controversial  –  between  two
pre-existing prokaryotic cells [Margulis, 1970]. Our own cells, like those
of all  other multi-celled organisms, contain mitochondria, the essential
energy processing units, now known to be descendants of once free-living
bacteria. No one wants to deny that mitochondria are parts of complex or-
ganisms like ourselves, yet everyone admits that they belong to an evolu-
tionary  lineage  with  a  quite  distinct  origin,  which  has  only  gradually
merged into that to which we belong [Lang et al., 1999].
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And there is spectrum of cases from such complete merger to quite
transitory association. Consider for instance the endosymbionts of most
arthropods, such as Wolbachia, or Buchnera in aphids, that are transmit-
ted  vertically  through  maternal  cells,  and  which  have  long  since  lost
many of the genes essential to survival, passing metabolic functions to
the host organism. Despite this obligate relationship evolutionary inter-
ests of the partners appear to diverge in some cases. Some Wolbachia, for
instance, can affect the sex-ratio of their hosts, for example, and some-
times do so in ways that promote the evolutionary interest of their partic-
ular strain of Wolbachia rather than that of their current hosts [O’Neill
et al., 1999]. Does this show that they are not yet to be counted parts of
the  host  organism,  even  though  the  two  are  fully  interdependent  and
in many cases neither could survive without the other?
Or consider, finally, the enormously successful leafcutter ants of the
genera Atta and Acromyrmex. Inside the vast colonies of these organisms
lie the fungus gardens, in which the leaves collected by the ants are con-
verted into a form that the ants can eat. The fungi associated with some
ant  species  have evolved to  become fully  dependent  on  the  ants,  and
no longer produce spores. As well as an elaborate internal division of labour
with  non-reproductive  workers  specialised  for  tasks  such  as  foraging,
guarding the colony, taking care of the nurseries, the fungus gardens, and
the waste disposal chambers, numerous microbial species play more or
less vital roles in the colony. The processing of the leaves require micro-
bial partners as well as the fungus; an internal symbiont in the ants pro-
duces an antibiotic that protects the fungus food from a dangerous fungal
pathogen;  and the ants  like  many other arthropods harbour  Wolbachia
[Van Borm et  al.,  2001].  Given  the  crucial  role  of  sex  determination
in the life cycle of an ant colony, perhaps it is these genetically reduced
endosymbionts that are really running the whole show.
What all this shows is at least that the notion of the organism as auto-
nomous is a hopeless one. The spectrum of dependencies from essential
endosymbionts through social division of labour to fortuitous ecological
interaction demonstrates that for organisms to survive requires a multi-
tude of interactions, some so fundamental to the way of life of the organ-
ism that there is no simple way of deciding whether they are mutualistic
symbionts or parts of the same living being.  The failure of autonomy,
in short, makes it highly questionable whether the organism has clear, ob-
jective boundaries.
All of this looks very different when we abandon the embedding of
our  concept  of  organism (and indeed of  biological  systems generally)
in the traditional substance centred metaphysics and accept an ontology of
process. Seen as a process, an organism is a stable pattern in an intricately
orchestrated array of processes at many levels of organisation. Internally,
these are chemical, metabolic processes within cells, and larger scale ac-
tions of, and interactions between, organs and other systems. Externally,
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there are interactions with a host of other organisms and abiotic features
of the environment. Crucially, as has been stressed by recent accounts of
niche construction, these interactions are bidirectional: organisms shape
their  environments in  ways that  promote the stability  of the  organism
[Odling-Smee et  al.,  2003].  Equally crucially,  the  organism is  part  of
a much  longer  process,  the  lineage.  The  lineage  also  persists  through
a host of interactions with living and non-living parts of the environment,
and  through  the  reproductive  capacities  of  its  constituent  organisms.
The lineage is stabilised by natural selection, and for many lineages in-
cluding our own the maintenance within the lineage of a population of
conspecifics is essential for the survival of the individual7. The flow of
life is sustained by a hierarchy of organised and interconnected systems
from the molecule to the lineage and the ecosystem.
The fact that the stabilisation of an organism involves external  as
well  as  internal  factors immediately implies that  it  is  not  autonomous
in the sense generally associated with a substance ontology. Moreover, as
I have tried to demonstrate, the complexity and intimacy of many symbi-
otic relations makes it difficult or impossible to specify the exact limits of
the organism. If we draw analogies not from rocks or tables, but rather
from partially stable processes such as eddies and flames, this should also
be unsurprising. There is surely no precise point at which the eddy ends
and the rest of the river begins. Similarly which side of the bacterial film
on the surface of my skin is my outer surface is not a question that re-
quires further scientific research, but a conceptual decision that should
depend in the end on the purposes for which the decision is being made.
Evolutionary studies, for example, may prefer a concept of the organism
that  includes only symbionts vertically transmitted from parent  to off-
spring, whereas a physiological concept might include any symbiont that
was essential, or even just useful, for the survival of the organism.
The recognition that living processes are stabilised both internally
and externally, from below and from above, is the key to a proper general
account of life. Living systems are hierarchies of processes at a range of
spatial and temporal scales. Their persistence comes from this embedding
and its explanation requires both the more traditional explanation in terms
of parts familiar in reductionist science, but also the constraints imposed
by their position in a larger whole. To take just one example almost at
random, the animal heart depends on an intricate array of cells of various
kinds and their  chemically  mediated interactions.  But  as  we all  know
from constant exhortations to exercise more, it depends also on the be-
haviour  of  the  whole  in  which  it  is  embedded.  Put  less  whimsically,
a heart can only survive embedded in a body with the capacity via various
other systems  –  respiratory, circulatory, etc.  –  to provide it with oxygen
and other inputs needed to maintain its structure and function. A similar
7 For a discussion of the interaction of lineage and organism processes, see [Dupré, 2017].
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story could be told for cells, or for molecular structures such as the ge-
nome, for which the multiple processes of maintenance and repair have
been well-documented.
Returning to the questions about autonomy and organismal bound-
aries, I conclude that these are handled much better by a process ontology
than a traditional ontology of substances. It might still  be thought that
the apparent persistence of organisms through time would call rather for
a substance ontology. But I have already discussed the problems for tradi-
tional substance ontology posed by the developmental trajectories that or-
ganisms  undergo,  and  the  massive  differences  in  properties  between
the stages of some developmental cycles. Again, a process ontology dis-
poses simply of this problem. Different stages of a process qualify as be-
longing to the same continuing process by virtue of the causal connec-
tions between them, not the properties, still less essential properties, that
they share. To take a non-biological example, a tropical depression can
become a hurricane and then decay into a large area of low pressure while
unproblematically remaining the same meteorological process.
I  must  acknowledge  in  passing  that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of
philosophical debate whether it even makes sense to consider a process
as a continuant, something that persists over time while perhaps undergo-
ing change (see, e.g.,  [Wiggins,  2016]).  It  is argued, for instance,  that
a process just is the set of its temporal parts; it cannot, therefore, persist
by acquiring new temporal parts. I won’t try to address these arguments
here, remarking only that as a matter of common sense there are pro-
cesses  that  last  over  considerable  periods  of  time  –  the  Red Spot  on
Jupiter, for instance, is a storm that has existed at least for several cen-
turies, for example, and it has got smaller over time, hence changing  –
and if  organisms are  ontologically  similar  to  storms rather  than rocks
there are vast numbers of processes undergoing persistence and, appar-
ently, change. Metaphysics should make sense of these primitive observa-
tions rather than talk itself into denying them.
A further advantage of the process perspective appears when we re-
call that the facts to be explained about the identity of organisms are not
nearly as simple as is still sometimes assumed. Consider the case of vege-
tative reproduction in plants, of which a classic example in the philosoph-
ical  literature  is  the  quaking  aspen  Populus  tremuloides [Bouchard,
2008]. A grove of these trees is typically formed from the growth of suck-
ers from roots, so that the whole grove is actually the result of a continu-
ous process of vegetative growth. Does that mean that the grove is just
one organism? Or might we argue that from the point of view of other, in-
teracting organisms each tree is an individual? And what should we say
when  the  root  connecting  the  tree  to  its  originating  plant  is  severed?
Do we have reproduction by dissection?
Within a process ontology we should take a comfortably pluralistic
attitude  to  these  questions.  The  development  of  the  grove  of  trees  is
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a process within the broader lineage process of the Aspen species, but
so  are  the  processes  that  constitute  individual  trees.  Just  as  a  battle
might be variously dissected in various ways into distinct skirmishes or
engagements;  or  a  river  might  be  divided  into  temporarily  separated
streams or tributaries; so a flow of living material may be variously di -
vided into individual organisms. Whereas a substance ontology has in-
tractable problems dealing even with the basic biological phenomenon
of cell division – when does one cell become two? – in a process onto-
logy we have merely a flow of life that can be divided into individuals
to suit our purposes.
4. Implications for Biology
Although many practicing biologists may find it somewhat alien to worry
about metaphysical questions, these cannot in the end be avoided. As the
twentieth century biologist and philosopher J.H. Woodger nicely ex-
pressed it,  “physiologists who suppose themselves to be above meta-
physics are only a very little  above it  – being up to the neck in it”
[Woodger, 1929, p. 246]. Metaphysics can be ignored but not escaped.
The explicit recognition of the processual nature of living systems has
profound implications across a wide range of biological issues. I shall
here briefly mention several of the most important such issues.
4.1. Evolution
Organisms develop but they do not, of course, evolve. What evolves are pop-
ulations, or species. What are these higher level entities? Or are they mere
abstractions, devices for describing distributions and frequencies of genuine
entities such as organisms or even genes? In accordance with the dominant
evolutionary or cladistic accounts of species, Michael Ghiselin and David
Hull have convinced many philosophers and biologists that species are indi-
viduals, branches of the tree of life [Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 1976]. This has en-
gendered a good deal of debate on such topics as whether individuals can be
as spatially discontinuous as a typical species. There has also been more re-
cent concern that the tree of life is not as robust as was once assumed. Grow-
ing awareness of lateral gene transfer, sometimes across great phylogenetic
distances, makes the tree look more like a web or a net.
Problems of these kinds can be quickly dissolved by the realisation
that species, or more generally lineages, are not individual things, but indi-
vidual processes [Dupré, 2017]. As we have seen, processes should not be
assumed to have sharp boundaries, and the principle of inclusion in an in-
dividual process is not continuity of properties, notoriously difficult to dis-
tinguish in an evolving lineage, but the right kind of causal connection.
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Seeing the lineage as a process points to an evolutionary role that is
easily  overlooked  from  more  traditional  perspectives.  This  is  its  role
in top-down stabilisation of individual organisms. In the first place this is
a satisfying way of understanding the role of stabilising selection. Though
this is not a causal influence on individual organisms, it is a central part
of the explanation of how actual organisms exist with the exquisite adap-
tations that enable them to survive (remain stable) at all. A condition of
the existence of an organism at all is that it belongs to a lineage that is it -
self stable. Such stability depends in ways that have been very widely
discussed on natural selection, but also on the existence of causal connec-
tions  between  successive  constituents  of  the  lineage,  organisms.  This
brings us to a topic that deserves a separate section, inheritance.
4.2. Inheritance
Lineages  maintain  themselves  by  reproduction,  and  a  notorious  fact
about this process is that like produces like. Clearly this is a condition
on, first, the continuation of a lineage as a coherent identifiable process
and,  second,  on  its  sustainability,  since  organisms have  an  integrated
suite of adaptations, properties that enable them to survive and, in turn,
reproduce. The capacity to transmit properties from parent to offspring is
what is referred to as inheritance. Recent neo-Darwinism has attributed
this  capacity  almost  exclusively  to  the  transmission  of  DNA,  in  its
cruder versions with DNA divided into genes with the ability to transmit
particular properties. Nowadays it is generally recognised that this kind
of partition makes little  sense.  There are few one-to-one relations be-
tween stretches of DNA and properties, and what there are tend to be
relatively insignificant or deleterious. Small variations in DNA and con-
sequences that these have on the phenotype may be important for evolu-
tionary theory, but they have minor importance for the broader under-
standing of inheritance.
The gene transmission theory of inheritance is  a classically thing-
centred story. How does one thing, the parent, influence the character of
another thing, the offspring? By passing a large collection of little things,
genes, to it. In a processual view we might rather start with the recogni-
tion of the lineage and the organism as part of a hierarchy of processes
mutually stabilising one another, as indicated by the general view of liv-
ing systems I sketched earlier. In this context it is easy to see that a much
broader view of inheritance is needed. Social and cultural processes, be-
havioural imitation of parents by offspring and the vital shaping of the
relevant environment by conspecifics in the process perhaps never better
described than in Darwin’s (1881) treatise on earthworms, but more ge-
nerally theorised today as niche construction, all  function as means of
passing traits from generation to generation. I should also mention one
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further process the importance of which has become increasingly clear
in recent science, epigenetics8.
It is likely objected that while these various processes of inheritance
may be important in describing the ontogeny of an organism, they lack
the special properties, notably longevity, required for evolution by natural
selection, and are thus of much less biological interest. Here, I think, we
have a  particularly striking instance of  thing-centred thinking.  Serious
evolutionary change, in a thing centred view, must involve the production
of new and stable things, namely genes. Even, as memorably argued by
Richard Dawkins in his classic book, The Selfish Gene (1976), immortal
things.  But  a  lineage,  like  any  process,  is  constantly  susceptible  to
change. Much of this change is random and unpredictable, but processes
that  persist  over long periods of time  –  and lineages are spectacularly
durable processes  – do so by having resources to change in response to
changing external conditions. Learning, changing the environment, modi-
fying social structures, and so on, are all good ways of so responding.
Perhaps the most crucial property of successful lineages, again a topic of
much recent discussion, is evolvability, a property that should encompass
all of these possible modes of change. The complaint that only genetic
change has the permanence required for evolutionary change, immortality
even, is particularly commonly heard in response to suggestions that epi-
genetics  might  be  an  important  evolutionary  process.  But  a  process
changes all the time, and changes that might in principle be reversed in
a relatively short time, may nonetheless be stabilised indefinitely. Again,
I can only see this yearning for permanence as a distorted expression of
the quest for the intrinsically unchanging substance.
Process  thinking  also  has  important  consequences  for  medicine.
I shall  mention just  two important  examples.  In the early years of the
germ theory of disease it was supposed that microbes are intrinsically bad
things, always liable to do us harm. This is a view still sometimes repre-
sented in advertisements for cleaning products. Now we realise that all
life is fundamentally dependent on microbial system and activities, and
the view of microbes as inherently bad is  indefensible. It  is easily re-
placed by a categorisation of microbes into the good, the bad, and the in-
different.  But  this is also indefensible. The same microbe will  support
some systems in some contexts and harm others in the same or different
contexts. Many of the bacteria that are essential for the functioning of our
gut will  cause catastrophic illness when they find their way into other
parts of our bodies. We cannot think of microbes and their hosts as things
with merely intrinsic properties.  What matters is the way they interact
within a great variety of complex processes9.
8 For detailed discussion of  the various dimensions recognised in  “extended inheri-
tance” views of evolution, see [Jablonka and Lamb, 2005].
9 For further discussion see [Méthot and Alizon, 2014].
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My second example is cancer. If the body is a thing that stays the
same until something comes along to change it, we will suppose that
every cancer has an identifiable cause, the intervention that disrupted the
default state of health. From a process perspective, we might better start
by considering the exquisitely accurate system of interacting processes
that regulate the precise balance between cell division, differentiation and
death, constrained both by the interactions of entities within the cell, and
by the placement  of the  cell  within particular  larger tissues  and other
structures. Failure of this mutual adjustment results in the multiple disor-
ders classified as cancers. The question we should ask first is why we
ever  don’t get cancer. From this point of view it is wholly unsurprising
that the causes of cancer are distributed across the genetic,  epigenetic,
cellular, tissue and environmental levels [Dupré and Bertolaso, 2018].
5. Philosophical Implications
I shall conclude with some very brief remarks about some more philo-
sophical topics greatly affected by the shift to a process ontology. In par-
ticular I shall consider some implications of the fact that humans, as or-
ganisms, are themselves processes.
The most obvious topic on which a processual ontology should bear
with respect to the human is that of personal identity, the major question
that has engaged problems about the persistence of an entity over time10.
Central to this debate have been imagined scenarios in which the mental
and physical continuity of a person have come apart, updated to modern
post-dualist philosophy with imagined brain transplants. The first point to
note is that the replacement of mind-body dualism with brain-body dual-
ism makes little sense in a process ontology. The brain is essential for the
proper functioning of the human organism in ways ranging from brain
stem control of a range of physiological processes to controlling the be-
haviour necessary for continued functioning. Here I assume without argu-
ment a version of the contemporary so-called “animalist” perspective, ac-
cording  to  which  a  human person is  some part  of  the  life  history  of
a human animal.
But second, if a human is a process, the continuity of which is deter-
mined by causal connections between its temporal stages, then there is no
special  requirement  of  common properties  between those  stages.  This
may be disquieting to those who think of personal identity in a more ro-
bust  way  as  requiring  some  kind  of  mental  coherence  over  time  for
the persistence of a person. My own view is that we should accept this
10 More detailed process-centred accounts of personal identity can be found in [Dupré,
2014] and [Meincke, 2018b].
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conclusion: I don’t think there is a great deal in common between myself
now and myself 50 years ago beyond causal continuity. Of course per-
sonal identity over time may well be a necessary assumption for the or-
ganisation of society and institutions ranging from the repayment of debts
to the infliction of criminal punishment. But these can be sufficiently jus-
tified  for  purely  practical,  social  reasons.  Identity,  in  the  strict  sense
in which it is often taken, is a fiction. I hasten to add that here I am not at-
tempting  to  offer  compelling  arguments  for  such  a  view,  but  merely
pointing out that the issue will  look quite different in a processualist
context.
I shall touch even more briefly on the topic of freedom of the will.
The determinism that sets up much of the dialectic on this topic is en-
tirely the product of a thing ontology that sees all causal capacity as origi-
nating from the lawlike behaviour of the simple things that compose the
universe.  Order  within  a  process  ontology  is  far  more  limited,  and
emerges only when an array of constraints and processes creates a more
or less orderly structure. Humans, from this point of view, are uniquely
dense concentrations of causal capacity. I think there is much to be said
for the widely endorsed compatibilist argument, in so far as that human
action  and  hence  freedom  must  be  and  is  compatible  with  whatever
proves to be the causal structure of the world. The problem is with the de-
terminism that many philosophers for some reason take to be licensed by
the progress of science. Humans, I propose, are causally powerful entities
(processes)  that  provide  the originating causes  of  multiple  changes to
their (thoroughly indeterministic) world. As I have argued for some time,
we are exceptional not for the randomness of our behaviour, but for its
capacity to impose order. Given this conclusion, concerns about whether
I could, when I act, have done otherwise may seem less pressing (see fur-
ther [Dupré, 2013; 2001, ch. 7]).
Finally, I naturally deny that humans are strongly autonomous. We are
massively  social  organisms,  uniquely  dependent  on  an  extraordinarily
complex division of labour without even worrying about our ecological
and symbiotic relations to a host of other organisms. A process ontology
should help to undermine the radical individualism that underlies a great
deal of Western social and political thought for the last two centuries or
so, and is expressed in scientific approaches such as neoclassical  eco-
nomics  or,  with  a  biological  twist,  evolutionary  psychology  [Dupré,
2001]. Happily, this insight undermines the conclusion of both these hy-
per-individualist scientific programmes, that humans are ultimately self-
ish and nasty. Given our place in a hierarchy of interconnected processes
including many  –  from social groups and families to evolutionary lin-
eages – of which we are merely contributing parts, there is no reason to
suppose that cooperative behaviour is inherently problematic. This is not,
of course, to deny that it is possible to provide social arrangements that




In this paper I have tried to show, first, that notwithstanding a great deal
of philosophical history, a process ontology is far more plausible than the
dominant thing or substance centred alternative. At the very least, a pro-
cess ontology makes much better  sense of living systems.  I have then
tried to show that beyond the phenomena that initially make a processual-
ist perspective so attractive, there are multiple implications of this meta-
physical shift, both for the biological sciences, and for philosophy more
broadly. In the last case, I have not tried to make detailed or watertight ar-
guments, merely to show that the metaphysical assumptions have poten-
tially significant consequences. My hope here is less to convince, than to
encourage further exploration of a vital philosophical perspective that has
been inexcusably neglected in many parts of the philosophical world.
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